Three years after Operation Al-Aqsa Flood on October 7, 2023, the Israeli occupation army is showcasing a sweeping overhaul of its security doctrine, operational readiness, and force structure, including more troops and reserves, greater depth, expanded intelligence and firepower, and more exercises designed to test its ability to respond to surprise, according to Yossi Yehoshua, Zionist military analyst for Yedioth Ahronoth.
“Before being impressed by this list, one simple fact must be remembered: three years ago, the Israeli military was one of the most powerful armies in the world, with intelligence capabilities among the most advanced globally, a powerful air force, special forces, an advanced barrier (fence), surveillance systems and technology—it lacked nothing,” he wrote. “And yet, on October 7, everything collapsed.”
Yehoshua said the real test of the changes the Israeli occupation army is presenting today “is not the number of new units created or the number of positions built. The real test will come the next time the enemy tries to surprise “Israel.” Will the army recognize what is happening in time this time? Will forces arrive more quickly? Will the leadership understand the situation in time? Will decisions be made before the event spirals out of control?”
“This is also the logic behind one of the central lessons being advanced by Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir: not merely trying to prevent surprise, but being capable of fighting when surprise occurs,” he added.
“This may sound obvious, but in reality it represents a major shift. For years, the defense doctrine was built around the combination of intelligence warning, the barrier, intelligence, and technological superiority. October 7 demonstrated the limitations of this concept. The problem was not simply that there was no warning. There was also a deeper problem: the army was not properly structured for the possibility that the scenario on which it had based its preparations would not be the scenario that actually unfolded.”
Yehoshua noted that Israeli military commanders “are now trying to address this by increasing alert levels and reserves, conducting exercises focused on surprise and extreme scenarios, reducing response times, and preparing fire plans in advance.”
“But caution is needed here as well,” he wrote. “An army can train for surprise dozens of times and still be surprised by something it never thought to train for.”
Do Not Wait for the Enemy to Reach the Fence
“The same idea is being repeated across all sectors: not to wait for the enemy to reach the fence or the settlement, but to try to establish an area in which it can be detected, stopped, and engaged before it gets there,” Yehoshua wrote.
“But this is precisely where we must stop and ask about the cost. Greater depth means more forces. More positions mean more manpower. More reserves mean more reserve duty. Greater offensive capability means more ammunition, intelligence, and budget. This is one of the major contradictions facing the Israeli military after three years of war. On the one hand, it wants more forces available on every front. On the other, it is facing extraordinary attrition and a manpower shortage.”
Viewing the Changes Critically
The writer said the changes also extend to force buildup. “New formations have been established, and battalions and rapid-response units have been added, along with loitering and drone capabilities. Intelligence collection and fire capabilities have been expanded, and formations have been created to provide greater force within the fronts themselves,” he wrote.
“About 40,000 reservists have been added to the force since the beginning of the war, tens of thousands of reservists have been reassigned, around 30 battalions have been added to the combat structure, and mandatory service has been extended to 32 months. This is an impressive list. But here too, we must remember what it tells us beyond the achievement. It tells us that the Israeli military before October 7 was simply not built for the war it entered.”
“Three years of war have forced it to add forces, extend service, expand the reserves, and establish units that did not previously exist. Some of these steps are the result of success and learning. Others are corrections to gaps that were exposed only after the war had already begun.”
The writer argued that “it is still too early to speak of a new security doctrine as a finished product. What is happening today is, in fact, a major attempt by the Israeli military to rebuild itself—a military capable of dealing with surprise and a multi-front war and with enemies seeking to strike the home front, while at the same time maintaining a long-term presence in areas it has occupied and preserving the effectiveness of its forces.”
Yehoshua said the most important lesson of October 7 “is not simply that there must be more tanks, more soldiers, or more positions. The lesson is that the army must not fall in love with its own doctrine. Three years ago, the Israeli military was confident it knew what war would look like. The enemy proved it wrong.”
“Therefore, these changes must also be viewed critically. Until they are tested by the next surprise, there is no way to know whether this amounts to a profound transformation or merely a correction of failures exposed in the previous war.”
“A security doctrine is not tested in documents, presentations, or by the number of units created. It is tested at the moment when intelligence says one thing, the enemy does another, and the entire system has to understand what is happening within minutes. That is where the Israeli military failed three years ago. And that is precisely where it will have to prove this time that it has learned,” he concluded.
Source: Agencies (translated and edited by Al-Manar)