Avi Gil, former military secretary to the prime minister of the occupation government, Benjamin Netanyahu, decided to break his silence three years after the October 7 attack, revealing details regarding the intelligence warnings that preceded the attack, the decisions made during that phase, and what he described as attempts to alter facts and direct responsibility to serve a specific political narrative.
Gil said his decision to speak out came in light of the failure to form an official committee of inquiry, following requests from bereaved families and families of former captives to testify, as well as reaching what he described as a “red line” due to the lies and half-truths accompanying the debate surrounding the events of October 7.
Netanyahu Received Warnings Before the Attack
Gil confirmed that Netanyahu was aware of the warnings prior to the attack, including warnings regarding the erosion of deterrence, messages conveyed by former Military Intelligence Director Amit Saar, and the “war warning” presented by Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar, without specifying a time or location.
According to Gil, Netanyahu refused to hold a joint discussion with the heads of the army, Shin Bet, and Mossad, preferring to meet with each of them individually. He also noted that Netanyahu linked the warnings he received to the protests in Israel against the government, known as the “Kaplan” protests.
This testimony highlights the nature of the information that reached the political echelon before the attack and how it was handled at a time when security indicators were increasing regarding a potential broad escalation.
Recommendations to Assassinate Hamas Leaders Rejected
Gil revealed that recommendations to target operatives in the Gaza Strip—including scenarios to assassinate Yahya Sinwar and Mohammed Deif—were presented repeatedly but were rejected under a policy of avoiding escalation and seeking normalization with Saudi Arabia.
Gil believes the responsibility for these decisions lies with the prime minister, whether he agreed to the security recommendations or decided to reject them, emphasizing that making the final decision does not exempt the political echelon from responsibility for its consequences.
In this context, Gil rejected attempts to place sole responsibility on the heads of the security agencies for the failures preceding October 7, asserting that accusing them of “treason” is used, in his view, to detach the political echelon from its responsibility for the attack.
He also pointed out that the documents presented to the State Comptroller do not represent all relevant documents related to the case.
The Morning of October 7: Controversial Calls and Timestamps
Regarding the early morning hours of October 7, Gil said the Shin Bet woke him at 06:12, and he called Netanyahu after the shooting started in a call lasting less than a minute, followed by another clearer call at 06:40.
He confirmed that intelligence reached the prime minister’s office, explaining that security agencies do not contact Netanyahu directly outside established channels, and that communication goes through the military secretary. He added that Netanyahu did not ask to speak with the Chief of Staff or the head of the Shin Bet that morning.
However, the most prominent development in Gil’s account relates to the timing of one of the calls. He revealed that Netanyahu’s Chief of Staff, Tzachi Braverman, manually altered the call timestamp in handwriting from 06:40 to 06:29, despite the presence of a digital signature on the document.
Gil added that he reported this matter to the Attorney General, describing what happened as a “criminal pattern” serving a narrative that Netanyahu was the only person acting from the initial moments of the attack.
These allegations place the documentation of communications during the critical hours of the attack at the center of the debate over the timeline of events and whether records were altered to influence the assignment of responsibility.
Egyptian Intelligence Plane and Hidden Facts
Gil touched upon information regarding the landing of an Egyptian intelligence plane that remained for over an hour, indicating an unreported meeting or message whose details remain hidden to this day.
Regarding reports of a potential phone call between Netanyahu and UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed, Gil did not confirm the call took place, but noted that making such a call without the military secretary’s knowledge is inappropriate.
According to his testimony, these issues remain part of the questions requiring clarification within a comprehensive investigation into the circumstances prior to the attack and the communications during it.
Second Hostage Deal Thwarted Under Political Pressure
On the negotiations file, Gil stated that after the first hostage deal in November 2023, there was an opportunity to reach another deal allowing the return of a larger number of living hostages.
However, he noted that Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich halted the process by threatening to bring down the government, which prompted Netanyahu—according to Gil’s account—to issue instructions not to present the deal document to the Security Cabinet.
This testimony, if details are confirmed, reflects the extent to which coalition considerations impacted decision-making regarding negotiations at a time when hostages’ families were pushing for agreements to secure their return.
Triangle of National, Political, and Personal Interests
In his evaluation of the war’s management, Gil said decisions were made within a triangle overlapping national interest, political interest, and personal interest, noting that political considerations were present in managing the war more than ever before.
He praised the roles of Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot in the War Cabinet, while criticizing what he described as the interference of political considerations in field and humanitarian decisions, pointing in this context to the disruption of aid trucks supported by the National Security Minister.
These positions present a picture of internal disputes over how the war was managed and the extent of party and coalition influence on security and military decisions.
Responsibility of Netanyahu and the Security System
While holding Netanyahu primarily responsible for political decisions, Gil did not exempt himself, emphasizing that responsibility falls on Netanyahu and everyone around him, including himself personally, because the system he served in for 35 years failed to prevent the attack.
This point gains importance amid ongoing debate inside Israel over responsibility for the October 7 failure, and whether it should be confined to security and intelligence agencies or expanded to include the political echelon and decision-making mechanisms.
In conclusion, Gil warned that a culture of avoiding investigation and accountability could lead to new failures, citing the Flydubai plane case and concluding with a warning that continuing this approach “will lead to the next disaster.”
The former military secretary’s testimony reopens the file of warnings prior to the attack, decisions made or rejected, and the nature of the relationship between the political leadership and security agencies, placing the demand for an official committee of inquiry at the center of the debate as the path to examining documents, communications, and establishing responsibilities based on evidence.
Source: Al-Manar English Website