The ambitions of Zionism have been always limitless; however formulating the strategic and tactical goals of the Israeli wars relies basically on the data of the battlefield.
The following report prepared by the Union Center for Research and Development highlights the Zionist military discourse in the period between March and May 2026.
The period from March to May 2026 witnessed notable fluctuation and escalation in the formulation of Israeli objectives toward the Lebanese front, with official statements ranging between the ceiling of major strategic demands and tactical battlefield goals. While the political echelon, represented by Benjamin Netanyahu and his Minister of War Yisrael Katz, focused on sweeping slogans such as “disarming Hezbollah and fully dismantling its capabilities” as a core condition for ending operations, military discourse evolved in tandem with battlefield realities and ground maneuvers in southern Lebanon. This phase was characterized by an attempt to impose a new security reality that goes beyond mere containment to initiative and offense, clearly reflected in the shift of military weight from other fronts (Iran) to make the Lebanese front the primary front. Nevertheless, a gap emerged within the enemy’s definition of victory between those who see it as comprehensive change in Lebanon, and those who see it as technical security for the northern border and the prevention of infiltrations and anti-tank missile platforms.
The statement by Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir on 10 May 2026 before the Knesset’s Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee stands out as a notable point here. After weeks of escalatory rhetoric that Zamir himself adopted, which focused on “completely removing the threat” and “delivering a devastating blow,” his latest statement suddenly redrew the limits of Israeli military power. The significance of Zamir’s latest statement lies in three key points:
1. *Redefining the army’s role*: By stating that “the army did not define disarming Hezbollah as a goal,” he places the ball in the political echelon’s court, attempting to shield the military establishment from failure to achieve a goal that may be unattainable through military means alone.
2. *Shifting responsibility*: The discourse shifted from Israel directly disarming, to “creating the conditions” to enable the Lebanese government to do so — a shift reflecting awareness of the complexities of the Lebanese arena and avoidance of being mired in a prolonged occupation without a political horizon.
3. *Field realism*: Limiting the objectives to “confronting anti-tank missiles and infiltration” reflects a focus on returning northern residents and securing the border strip as a top and realistic priority, irrespective of high political ambitions that may not align with the cost of a continued war.[Hezbollah]
This shift in Zamir’s position represents the peak of the interaction between strategic ambition and field constraints, moving from the language of “final decisiveness” to the language of “managing the threat and preparing the political theater,” raising questions about the extent to which military performance aligns with the ceilings set by Netanyahu and Katz throughout the war.
Below is a chronological presentation of official Israeli statements regarding the objectives of the war/operations against Lebanon during the period from March 2026 to 11 May 2026, based solely on official Israeli statements and positions:
*First: Prime Minister – Benjamin Netanyahu*
– *30 March 2026*: Announced the expansion of military operations in southern Lebanon, defining the objectives as follows:
o Expand the “security zone.”
o Thwart the threat of infiltration from Lebanon into Israel.
o Push anti-tank missile fire away from the border.
o Prevent Hezbollah from continuing to fire rockets at Israel.
– *15 April 2026*: In a video message on negotiations with Lebanon, Netanyahu stated that “Israel has two central goals”:
1. Dismantle/disarm Hezbollah.
2. Achieve lasting peace from a position of strength.
He added that “the Israeli army continues to strike Hezbollah and reinforce its presence inside the buffer zone.”
*Second: Chief of Staff – Eyal Zamir*
– *2 March 2026*: During a meeting with northern region commanders, announced:
o The military operation will not end before removing Hezbollah’s threat.
o Insistence on disarming Hezbollah.
o Israel will no longer rely on the Lebanese state to handle the file.
o Delivering a devastating blow to Hezbollah.
– *21 March 2026*: Zamir announced the adoption of a new policy in Lebanon based on:
o No more containment, but initiative and offense.
o Rejection of returning to a policy of limited rounds.
o Continuation of the war until the threat to the northern border is removed.
– *22 March 2026*: After a security assessment session, Zamir announced:
o Deepening the ground maneuver inside Lebanon.
o Intensifying military strikes.
o Completely removing the border threat.
o Ensuring “long-term security” for northern residents.
o Readiness for a prolonged campaign against Hezbollah.
– *9 April 2026*: Zamir stated that:
o The Lebanese front has become the main front.
o Israel is ready to return to war with great force at any moment.
o Hezbollah has become more isolated within Lebanon and from Iran.
– *29 April 2026*: During a visit to the area where the enemy army is present in southern Lebanon, Zamir said:
o Any threat against forces or settlements will be eliminated.
o Targeting will also include areas north of the Litani.
o Israel achieved what the political echelon requested in Lebanon and Iran, and even exceeded it.
– *10 May 2026*: During a review before the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, Zamir said:
o “The Israeli army did not define disarming Hezbollah” as a goal.
o There is no ceasefire in Lebanon.
o Other objectives in Lebanon are: “acting against anti-tank missiles, infiltration, and creating conditions so the Lebanese government can disarm Hezbollah.”
*Third: Minister of War – Yisrael Katz*
– *3 April 2026*: Affirmed that:
o Israel’s highest objective is disarming Hezbollah.
o Achieving this goal will be done “politically or militarily.”
o The disarmament issue is independent of the war with Iran.
– *17 April 2026*: Katz announced that:
o The Israeli army will continue to control the areas it occupied in southern Lebanon.
o The ceasefire is “temporary.”
o The war’s objective remains: disarming Hezbollah and achieving it through military or political means.
*Fourth: President of the Entity – Yitzhak Herzog*
– *8 March 2026*: During a tour in northern Israel, he affirmed that “Israel will respond with full force to anyone who threatens its security,” noting that the goal is to protect the northern front and prevent threats to northern settlements.
*Fifth: Foreign Minister – Gideon Sa’ar*
– *9 March 2026*: In his meeting with the UN Special Coordinator for Lebanon, stressed several Israeli objectives:
o Protecting northern Israeli residents.
o Maintaining the deployment of the Israeli army in the border area to prevent any Hezbollah ground infiltration.
o Weakening Hezbollah, considering it “a common interest for Israel and Lebanon.”
o Affirming that Israel will act unilaterally if the international community does not move.
– *20 March 2026*: During his reception of the French Foreign Minister, presented the following Israeli objectives:
o Continuing to target Hezbollah operatives.
o Full international delegitimization of Hezbollah.
o Holding the Lebanese state and the Lebanese army responsible for failing to prevent Hezbollah activity south of the Litani.
o Israel continuing to “defend itself and act decisively against anyone seeking to eliminate it.”
*Sixth: Official Israeli Estimates (Operation “Lion of Zion”)*
– *30 March 2026*: In official Israeli economic and security documents and assessments, there was talk of continued fighting in Lebanon until the end of April, linking this to the military and security objectives of the campaign. The documents also showed that the war includes an extended confrontation with Hezbollah on the northern front.
Source: Union Center for Research and Development