According to a study by the Cato Institute, the US war with Iran—despite demonstrating overwhelming firepower during Operation Epic Fury—resulted in significant strategic and material losses that exposed the fragility of Washington’s military posture in the region.
The Cato Institute notes that while the United States “inflicted substantial losses on Iran’s military,” it failed to secure a decisive outcome. As the study states, “the war was not won,” with Iran able “to stay in the fight, keep taking shots, and convince the US to reach for diplomacy.” This, the institute suggests, reflects a widening gap between US battlefield capabilities and its ability to achieve strategic victory.
A central focus of the Cato Institute analysis is the cost imposed on US forces through sustained Iranian retaliation. The study reports that “Iranian missiles and drones hit at least a dozen US bases,” directly targeting American military infrastructure across the region. These attacks resulted in casualties, with “six US soldiers… killed in strikes on US bases in Kuwait,” underscoring the human toll of the conflict.
The Cato Institute further highlights significant material losses. Strikes on Prince Sultan Air Base led to the destruction of “a valuable E-3 Sentry AWACS aircraft” and damage or destruction to “several tanker aircraft,” assets essential for surveillance and aerial operations. Such losses, the study implies, weaken the US military’s operational effectiveness even as it maintains overall superiority.
Operational disruption was also widespread. The Cato Institute cites the Pentagon’s decision to reduce the physical presence of personnel at forward bases due to persistent threats. Quoting external reporting, the study notes that “many of the 13 military bases in the region used by American troops are all but uninhabitable,” illustrating the extent to which US facilities were rendered ineffective under sustained attack.
At the core of the Cato Institute assessment is a structural critique of US military strategy. With approximately 40,000 troops deployed across large installations in the Gulf, these bases became, in the study’s words, “tantalizing targets” rather than secure centers of power projection.
The institute ultimately raises broader strategic concerns, asking “how much deterrence and operational value does the US derive from military infrastructure that can be targeted” so effectively. The implication, according to the Cato Institute, is that the United States’ forward deployment model is increasingly vulnerable in the face of missile and drone warfare.
In sum, the Cato Institute concludes that even against a “severely degraded” adversary, the United States incurred notable human, material, and strategic losses—calling into question the resilience and effectiveness of its current military posture in the region.
Source: Cato Institute (edited by Al-Manar)